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Old Chief v. United States: Radical Change
or Minor Departure? How Much Further
Will Courts Go in Limiting the Prosecution's
Ability to Try Its Case?

In Old Chief v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held
that a district court abused its discretion under rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence ("Rule 403") when it refused a defendant's offer to
stipulate to a prior assault conviction, and instead admitted the full
record of the conviction, when the sole purpose of the evidence was to
prove the prior conviction element of a felon in possession of a firearm
charge.2 The holding marks the first time the Supreme Court has
limited the time-honored principal of allowing the prosecution the
freedom to refuse offers to stipulate and to try its case as it sees fit.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Old Chief was arrested in 1993 after an altercation
involving the discharge of a firearm. Old Chief was charged with the
crimes of assault with a dangerous weapon, using a firearm in relation
to a crime of violence, and violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).' The
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was the focus of the litigation. The
statute makes it a crime for anyone who has been convicted of a felony
punishable by more than a year in prison to possess any firearm.4 Old

Chief had previously been convicted of this type of a felny-assault
causing serious bodily injury
Before trial Old Chief moved for an order requiring the government to
refrain from mentioning or offering any evidence of the prior conviction
except to say he had been convicted of a crime that was punishable by
imprisonment exceeding one year. The Assistant United States Attorney
refused to accept Old Chief's stipulation, arguing that the Government
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
Id. at 647.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1996).
117 S. Ct. at 647.
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had a right to prove its case in its own way. The United States District
Court for the District of Montana agreed and allowed the Government
to introduce the order of judgment and commitment for Old Chief's prior
conviction. The order revealed that Old Chief knowingly and unlawfully
assaulted Rory Dean Fenner, causing serious bodily harm, and that Old
Chief was sentenced to five years imprisonment. Old Chief was
convicted on all counts, and he appealed.' The Ninth Circuit, in a
rather cursory decision, stated that the Government had the right to
prove a prior felony conviction by introducing probative evidence
regardless of whether the defense offered to stipulate to the conviction.7
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit stated that offers to stipulate have "no
place in the Rule 403 balancing process," and therefore the district court
did not abuse its discretion by allowing evidence of Old Chief's prior
conviction to be introduced to "prove that element of the unlawful
possession charge."'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a sharp division
among the courts of appeals in the treatment of a defendant's efforts to
exclude the introduction into evidence of the name and nature of prior
convictions in situations similar to the case at bar.9 The Supreme Court
resolved the conflict, reversed the judgment, and remanded the case to
the Ninth Circuit. ° The Court held that in cases in which the prior
conviction is likely to support a jury verdict based on improper
considerations, the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the
probative value of the evidence of the name and nature of the offense."
It was therefore an abuse of discretion to admit the record of the prior
conviction when the defendant offered to stipulate. 2
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The courts of appeals of the various circuits have been divided on the
issue of whether and under what circumstances a defendant may
stipulate to an element of the offense charged in an attempt to prevent
the name and nature of a prior conviction from being introduced into
evidence. 3 The Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari was a direct
consequence of this sharp division.' 4
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 647-48.
Id. at 649.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 655.
Id.
Id at 649.
Id.
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On one side of the line were the Sixth," Eighth,16 and Ninth"7
Circuits, which recognized the right of the prosecution to refuse a
defense stipulation and to present evidence of prior offenses as they saw
fit."5 Indicative of the reasoning in these circuits were the decisions in
United States v. Smith 9 and United States v. Breitkreutz.20 In Smith
the Eighth Circuit held that the Government was not required to accept
any of the defendant's stipulations, nor was it limited to establishing
only one of two prior felony convictions. 2' Defendant Robert Smith was
convicted in the District Court of Minnesota of unlawfully receiving a
firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1).2 2 Under section
1202(a)(1), the Government had to establish that defendant had been
convicted of at least one prior felony.2 Having been convicted of two
prior felonies, defendant offered to stipulate, in lieu of the introduction
into evidence of a 1970 conviction for felony possession, that the jury
may accept as fact that he had been convicted of a prior felony.
Alternatively, defendant offered to stipulate to a 1961 felony conviction
in an effort to prevent introduction of the 1970 conviction. The
Government refused to accept either stipulation, and defendant
appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting evidence of
the 1970 conviction without giving the jury a limiting instruction about
how the evidence should be treated. 24 The majority pointed out that no
limiting instruction was requested and that had the request been made,
it would have been up to the discretion of the district court in deciding
whether to give an instruction. 2' Furthermore, the majority held that
the Government was not required to accept either of the defendant's
stipulations, and the Government was not "necessarily" limited to
establishing only one of the two prior felony convictions.26 Though
there may be an occasion when it might be prejudicial to allow the
Government to prove multiple prior convictions, the majority stated that

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1976).
United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1975).
United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1993).
117 S.Ct. at 649.
520 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1975).
8 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1993).

21. 520 F.2d at 548.
22. Id. at 546. Note that 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) is now codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(gXl).
23. 520 F.2d at 548.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 549.
26. Id. at 548.
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this was not one of those cases and that defendant was 7not substantially
prejudiced by proof of the 1961 and 1970 convictions.1
Eighteen years later, in United States v. Breitkreutz,2s the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held fast to the notion that the Government, regardless of defendant's offer to stipulate to the existence of a
prior offense, was not precluded from offering evidence of the prior
offense.2' Defendant Douglas Breitkreutz was convicted of being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).30 On
appeal Breitkreutz raised two separate arguments based on Rule 403.31
First, he contended that the Government should not have been allowed
to introduce evidence of any prior convictions because he had offered to
stipulate that he was a convicted felon. Second, like the defendant in
Smith, Breitkreutz argued that even if the Government could introduce
evidence to prove the existence of prior felony convictions, it should have
been limited to proving only one and not all three of Breitkreutz's
felony
32
convictions in order to satisfy its section 922(g) burden.
Regarding Breitkreutz's first argument, the majority held that it is a
long-standing rule that the prosecution cannot be forced to accept a
defendant's stipulation because doing so would allow the accused to
"plead out" an element of the charged offense." Furthermore, the
majority stated that a stipulation was not an alternative means of proof
34
and therefore had no place in the Rule 403 balancing process.
However, unlike the court in Smith, the majority agreed with defendant's second Rule 403 argument and held that once the Government
had proved one prior conviction, proof of the other convictions would add
very little probative value and thus would likely fail the Rule 403
balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice.35
On the other side of the division between the circuits were the
First,"5 Fourth, 7 Tenth," and D.C. 9 Circuits. These circuits main-

27. Id.
28. 8 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1993).
29. Id. at 690.

30. Id. at 689.
31. Id. at 690. "Rule 403 states: 'Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'" Id. at n.1 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 403).

32. Id. at 690.
33. Id. at 691 (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Right to "PleadOut" Issues and
Block the Admission of PrejudicialEvidence: The Differential Treatment of Civil Litigants
and the CriminalAccused as a Denial ofEqual Protection,40 EMORY L.J. 341, 357 (1991)).
34. Id. at 691-92.
35. Id. at 692.
36. United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).
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tained that a defendant's offer to stipulate to or admit to prior convictions places a duty upon the trial court to exclude from the case the
name and nature of the prior offense.' In United States v. Tavares,41
the First Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by
allowing the Government to reject the defendant's stipulation.42 Once
again, as in the cases cited before, defendant was tried and convicted of
being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) and raised a Rule 403 objection.4" The majority admitted
that there is a well-established right of the Government to present its
case as it sees fit." A caveat to this rule was warranted, however, with
felon in possession cases because the stipulated facts strictly showed
defendant's legal status as a felon and did not prove the crime currently
charged. 4' The Government's ability to try the case as it sees fit was
in no way weakened by requiring it to accept a stipulation to establish
defendant's status as a felon because the status element was a "discrete
and independent component of the crime.., reflecting a Congressional
policy that possession of a firearm is categorically prohibited for those
individuals who have been convicted of a wide assortment of crimes
calling for a punishment of over a year's imprisonment."46 A defendant
fits the requirement of section 922(g)(1) simply by having a prior felony
conviction that called for over one year's imprisonment regardless of
whether the conviction was for assault or for "the most aggravated
murder."4 7 The majority concluded that the existence of a prior
conviction was only relevant to show defendant's status and that
disclosing the full nature of the prior offense, even if not prejudicial, was
"beside the point." s
A little over a year after the decision in Tavares, the D.C. Circuit, in
United States v. Jones,49 adopted the language and reasoning in
Tavares and held that the district court abused its discretion by denying
defendant's motion to exclude evidence of the nature of his prior

37.
38.
39.

United States v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1979).
United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1995).
United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

40.

117 S. Ct. at 649.

41.

21 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).

42. Id. at 2.
43. Id.

44. Id. at 4.
45. Id. at 3.
46.

Id. at 4.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 67 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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conviction. 0 The majority decision was particularly influenced by what
it regarded as the manifest danger of undue prejudice in allowing the
nature of the prior convictions to be presented to the jury because the
current charges were virtually identical to the prior felony convictions.51
Taking cues from Tavares' and other cases from the various
circuits, 3 the Supreme Court in Old Chief attempted to carve out a
rule that would settle the dispute between the circuits regarding how to
treat stipulations in the context of the admission of evidence of prior
convictions.

III. THE SUPREME COURT RATIONALE
The Supreme Court holding centers on the notion that admitting
evidence of the name and nature of Old Chief's prior conviction was
unnecessary to prove his legal status as a felon." Though the name of
his prior offense may have been technically relevant, it did not address
any "detail in the definition of the prior-conviction element that would
not have been covered by [his] stipulation or admission."' Indeed,
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, stated that the statutory
language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), in which the prior conviction
requirement is contained, evidences no congressional concern with the
name of the prior crime other than what is necessary to place it among
the general class of felonies that satisfy the prior conviction requirement.56 Logic, according to Justice Souter, was on Old Chiefs side.5
The Government argued it had the right to present and prove its case
by evidence of its own choosing, free from any offers or attempts by
defendant to stipulate "his way out of the full evidentiary force of the
case" as presented by the government.' The majority acknowledged
that though the general rule that the Government is entitled to prove its
case free from any defense stipulations or admissions rests on good

50. Id,at 324. Mr. Jones was charged with six counts including possession with intent
to distribute cocaine and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id at 320. The prior
felony was for possession with intent to distribute. Id. at 321. Jones's attorney offered to
stipulate that Jones had a prior felony conviction and asked that evidence of the name and
nature of the prior conviction be excluded pursuant to Rule 403. Id.
51. Id. at 321.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

117 S.Ct. at 655 (citing Tavares, 21 F.3d. at 4).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 653.
Id
ti
Id.
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sense, it had no application when the issue at hand rested on defendant's legal status.5 9 The only thing the jury needed to know was that
defendant's prior conviction fell within the class of crimes that Congress
intended the statute to cover." Defendant's admission to this point
coupled with the court's jury instructions were sufficient to satisfy the
statutory requirement.6 '
Indeed, the majority concluded that the general rule that the
prosecution may choose its evidence freely had no application in this
case because proof of defendant's status was entirely unrelated to what
defendant was thinking or intending when he committed the current
offense."2 Defendant's offer to stipulate or admit to his status as a
felon took nothing away from the prosecution's presentation of evidence
to satisfy its burden of proving the crimes alleged.' In the Rule 403
balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice, the risk of unfair
prejudice in admitting the full record of the prior conviction, despite
defendant's offer to stipulate to his status as a felon, substantially
outweighed the probative value of that evidence.4
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas,"
stated in her dissent that the majority misapplied Rule 403 and thus
The
upset "longstanding precedent regarding criminal prosecutions.'
dissent disagreed that admitting the name and nature of the prior
conviction unfairly prejudiced Old Chief within the meaning of Rule
403.7 Rather, the dissent concluded that the name and nature of the
offense was an essential element in satisfying the section 922(g)(1) prior
conviction requirement. In fact, the dissent reasoned that the structure
of section 922(g)(1) indicates that Congress intended jurors to learn of
the name and nature of the defendant's prior crime." Because section
922(g)(1) excludes certain crimes from inclusion, 9 the dissent reasoned
that it necessarily follows that the term "crime" as used in the language
of section 922(g)(1) is not an "abstract or metaphysical concept" and that

59. Id. at 654.
60. Id. at 655.
61. 1d
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 656.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Certain business crimes and state misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment of
two years or less are excluded from the prior felony conviction requirement of section
922(gXl). 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (1996 & Supp. 1997).
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the Government must prove that defendant committed a specific
crime.7" Furthermore, Justice O'Connor asserted that evidence of the
name and nature of the offense was direct proof of a necessary element
of the offense charged.7 Therefore, to say, as the majority does, that
it "'unfairly' prejudice[d] the defendant for the government to establish
its [section] 922(g)(1) case with evidence showing that, in fact, the
defendant did commit a prior offense misreads the Rules of Evidence and
defies common sense."72 The dissent concluded that "like it or not,
Congress chose to make a defendant's prior criminal conviction one of
the two elements of the [section] 922(g)(1) offense." 3 Therefore,
defendant was not convicted of some "unspecified crime;" he was
convicted of a named crime, and therefore it was not unfairly prejudicial
for the Government to prove the prior conviction with evidence of the
name and nature of the prior offense. 4
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court decision in Old Chief marked the first time the
Court has limited how the prosecution may present and prove its case
by forcing it to accept a defense stipulation. Therefore, Old Chief
represented a "remarkable drawing of a line in the sand" by "corralling"
the previously unbridled discretion of district courts under Rule 403.7"
However, it is possible that the holding in Old Chief will be limited to
its facts. Indeed, as one commentator has stated, "Rule 403 after Old
78
Chief may well closely resemble Rule 403 before Old Chief."
In fact,
the mojority in Old Chief recognized that the general rule that the
prosecution should be free to prove its case free from any defense offers
to stipulate "rests on good sense."77 However, the Court cautioned that
though a "naked proposition" in the form of a stipulation was "no match
for the robust evidence that could be used to prove it," the prosecution's
right to offer that evidence has "virtually no application when the point
at issue is a defendant's legal status.""'

70.

117 S. Ct. at 656-57.

71. Id. at 656.
72. Id. at 657-58.
73. Id. at 660.
74. Id.
75. David Rudolf & Gordon Widenhouse, Reeling in OtherwiseRelevant Evidence Due
to Unfair Prejudice, 21 MAR CHAMPION 46 (Mar. 1997).
76. Louis A. Jacobs, Evidence Rule 403 After United States v. Old Chief, 20 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 563, 590 (Spring 1997).
77. 117 S. Ct. at 654.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
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However, it is also possible that Old Chief will be the first step in a
radical change in how criminal cases are tried. Courts now have a
choice of limiting the rationale of Old Chief to felony-possession cases,
or courts may choose to apply the decision in Old Chief to any and all
instances when the defendant offers to stipulate to some element or
aspect of the crime charged. An indication of which route the courts will
take may soon be answered. As of the writing of this Note, a case in the
D.C. Circuit, United States v. Crowder,9 has been remanded in light of
the decision in Old Chief The decision in Crowder will likely indicate
just how far courts are going to be willing to extend the holding in Old
Chief outside the realm of proof of status.
The defendant in Crowder, charged with possession with intent to
distribute crack and heroin, offered to concede all elements of the offense
except possession.s' Crowder admitted that the substances seized were
indeed crack and heroin and that "'anybody who possessed those drugs
possessed them with the intent to distribute. "" Crowder contended
that because he was willing to concede that whoever possessed the drugs
had the intent to distribute them, no evidence of his prior act of selling
drugs to an undercover policeman could be introduced to show intent.82
The court of appeals remanded the case, ruling that the district court
erred in admitting evidence of Crowder's prior drug sale to establish
intent.8 3 What the court of appeals holds on remand from the Supreme
Court in light of Old Chief may help shed some light on whether the
defendant's right to stipulate will be extended to situations in which the
evidence goes to the proof of an element of the charged crime and not
just to the existence of a prior conviction."

79. 87 F.3d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997).
80. 87 F.3d at 1409.
81. Id. at 1412.
82. Id. at 1412-13.
83. Id.
84. The D.C. Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Rezaq may indicate which
direction the circuit court will choose in Crowder. No. 96-3127, 1998 WL 44439, at *1 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 6, 1998). In Rezaq defendant was convicted in the district court of one count of
aircraft piracy under 49 U.S.C. app. § 1427(n) (1994) arising out of a 1985 hijacking of an
Air Egypt jet. Id. at *1. Defendant had previously pleaded guilty in Malta to the murder
of two of the passengers and offered to stipulate in the district court that the passengers
had died. On appeal defendant contended that his trial had been "fatally tainted" by the
introduction of evidence of the murders. Id. The court of appeals held that Old Chief had
established an exception to the rule that the prosecution was free to prove its case without
having to accept defense stipulations. Id. at *15. However, the court ruled that the
exception created by Old Chief only applied when "the evidentiary issue is one of'status'" and that the exception did not apply in the case at bar. Id. (quoting Old Chief, 117
S. Ct. at 655).
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Until the courts rule on how expansive the holding in Old Chief is,
defense attorneys have a tremendous window of opportunity to push for
an expansive reading of Old Chief and to offer to stipulate to any
prejudicial or detrimental elements of the crime in order to preclude the
jury from being influenced by the introduction of evidence of those
crimes. Consider for example how this might have worked in practice
in the Oklahoma City bombing prosecution. If an expanded version of
the rule in Old Chief had been applied, the defense could have offered
to stipulate to the fact that over 168 people died, thereby precluding the
prosecution from producing any evidence of how those deaths occurred.
The defense could have thereby prevented the prejudice caused by the
introduction of gory and heart-wrenching evidence of how people were
crushed to death and how others lost loved ones. Keeping this emotionally charged evidence from the jury would likely have had a profound
effect on how the jury reached its verdict. It would also have constituted
a dramatic departure from the way criminal cases are tried.
If the courts decide to expand the holding of Old Chief outside the
realm of proof of prior convictions in felony-possession cases, defendants
will have a new, very powerful weapon at their disposal. By offering to
stipulate, the defense could force the hand of the prosecution, thereby
cutting into the prosecution's ability to present its case as it sees fit.
ScoTT PATTERSON

